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Abstract
The deep connection between the interpretation of theories invariant
under local symmetry transformations (i.e. gauge theories) and the phi-
losophy of space and time can be illustrated nonrelativistically via the
investigation of reparameterisation invariant reformulations of Newtonian
mechanics, such as Jacobi’s theory. Like general relativity, the canoni-
cal formulation of such theories feature Hamiltonian constraints; and like
general relativity, the interpretation of these constraints along conventional
Dirac lines is highly problematic in that it leads to a nonrelativistic variant
of the infamous problem of time. I argue that, nonrelativistically at least,
the source of the problem can be found precisely within the symplectic re-
duction that goes along with strict adherence to the Dirac view. Avoiding
reduction, two viable alternative strategies for dealing with Hamiltonian
constraints are available. Each is found to lead us to a novel and interesting
re-conception of time and change within nonrelativistic mechanics. Both
these strategies and the failure of reduction have important implications
for the debate concerning the relational or absolute status of time within
physical theory.
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1 Introduction
Certain physical systems are such that the mathematical representation describ-
ing them is degenerate – they contain what Redhead ([2003]) labels ‘surplus
structure’. By this we mean that the relevant equations of motion (together with
the same initial data) produce multiple physically indistinguishable but mathe-
matically distinct solutions. We can represent these formal redundancies in terms
of groups of symmetry transformations on a space of possible configurations of
the system and if these groups act locally we call them gauge symmetries. In
order to determine a unique mathematical representation for a system displaying
gauge symmetries the theory of constrained Hamiltonian mechanics was devel-
oped (Dirac [1958a],[1964]; Henneaux and Teitelboim [1992]). This theory allows
us to characterise the degeneracy precisely in terms of (first class) constraint
functions on phase space and regulate it by providing equations that pick out
dynamics that is independent of the action of the constraints. Geometrically
Dirac’s procedure for eliminating degeneracy within gauge theories can be under-
stood in terms of a process of reduction from a constraint manifold within phase
space with a presymplectic geometry to a reduced phase space with a symplectic
geometry (Gotay and Nester [1978]). Interpretationally, this reduction process
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can be endowed with the significant role of providing a passage from a dynam-
ical arena with excess representational structure to one which provides a direct
representation of the true dynamical degrees of freedom (on this point see Belot
[2007] and Butterfield [2007]).
The general theory of relativity explicitly features local redundancy in the
form of diffeomorphism invariance and can be cast into a constrained Hamilto-
nian formalism known as canonical general relativity (Dirac [1958b]; Bergmann
[1961]; Arnowitt et al. [1962]; Misner et al. [1970]). Perplexingly, however, once
rendered into constrained Hamiltonian form the degeneracy of the theory seems
to become entangled with the dynamics since the canonical Hamiltonian is itself
a first class constraint. Thus, according to Dirac’s work, even though it effects
the the transformations between three dimensional hypersurfaces that play the
role of time in the theory, the Hamiltonian constraint should be interpreted as a
gauge generator. Furthermore, if we accept that the Hamiltonian is gauge gener-
ating then it would seem that we must classify as representing observables only
functions which weakly commute with it.1 This class of observables cannot vary
along entire histories of a system and are therefore unable to change with respect
to any temporal variable which parameterises the history. Correspondingly, from
a geometric perspective application of symplectic reduction techniques to canon-
ical general relativity is understood as leading to a reduced phase space which,
despite having a symplectic structure, can no longer be understood as represent-
ing temporal evolution of either states or observables (see Belot and Earman
[2001]; Rickles [2008]; Belot [2007]). This is the essence of the the problem of
time in classical gravity – it is intimately connected to various issues that beset
attempts to formulate a quantum theory of gravity and are grouped together as
the problem of time in quantum gravity (Kucharˇ [1988]; Isham [1992]; Anderson
[2010]).
The chain of argument leading to the classical problem of time is controversial.
In particular, Kucharˇ ([1992]) and Barbour ([1994]) have argued that there are
characteristics peculiar to the Hamiltonian constraint which mean we should not
follow the standard procedure and treat it as gauge generating. In a similar
fashion, Pons and Salisbury ([2005]) argue that Dirac’s analysis is incomplete
(Pons [2005]) since gauge symmetry groups should be more properly thought
of as acting on the space of entire solutions rather than, as Dirac assumes, at
a given time. Thus, under their analysis it is simply erroneous to identify the
Hamiltonian (which acts on initial data points in order to create solutions) as a
gauge generator. Also in this anti-Dirac spirit, Barbour and Foster ([2009]) have
explicitly considered the case of Jacobi’s theory which provides a useful model
for general relativity since its reparameterisation invariant action and vanishing
Hamiltonian make it timeless in a fundamental sense. Contrary to Dirac’s work
they conclude that the Hamiltonian can be taken to generate genuine physical
change and that observables that do not weakly commute with the Hamiltonian
can be defined consistently.
1A function is said to weekly commute with a constraint when the Poisson bracket between
the function and the constraint is zero when calculated on the sub-manifold within the phase
space defined by satisfaction of the constraint.
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A principle purpose of this paper is to examine these significant claims on
a technical and interpretive level within the context of the geometric presenta-
tion of the problem of time in nonrelativistic mechanics. Within §2, we first
provide a concise introduction to the relevant ideas from geometrical mechanics
before presenting Dirac’s argument for the classification of first class constraints
as gauge generating in terms of a simplified version of the symplectic reduction
procedure. In §4 we will then consider the potential application of this symplectic
reduction to a class of nonrelativistic reparameterisation invariant theories (such
as Jacobi’s theory) within which the Hamiltonian is the only constraint. It will
be argued—contra received orthodoxy—that the application of this geometric
version of Dirac’s work is inappropriate for this case and therefore not generally
applicable. This leaves open the question of how we should define both change
and observables within nonrelativistic reparameterisation invariant mechanics.
Utilising the symplectic formalism that has been introduced we will then, in §5,
evaluate two rival positions that offer new methodologies for defining both change
and observables – these will be designated ‘the emergent time strategy’ and ‘the
correlation strategy’ respectively.2
A further purpose is to illustrate a number of novel and important interpre-
tative consequence which can be derived from our negative result regarding sym-
plectic reduction together with the geometric structure of our two non-reductive
schemes. In §3 we will examine the connection between gauge theory, possibility
space reduction, Haecceitism, and the ontological indeterminism issue that might
be seen to undermine certain interpretations. Building upon this discussion, and
the results of §4-5, in §6 we will first consider the positions of relationalism and
substantivalism (and their variants) as they have been discussed in the context
of space and space-time. We will then introduce the corresponding notions of
temporal relationalism and temporal substantivalism. The case of time in non-
relativistic reparameterisation invariant mechanics will then be demonstrated to
force upon us a number of revisions to the supposedly canonical, existing analysis
of gauge theory and space-time ontology. In particular: i) Within the Hamiltonian
formulation of Jacobi’s theory the ontological indeterminism issue is found not to
threaten the Haecceitistic variant of temporal substantivalism; ii) The framework
for connecting the treatment of constraints to the relationalism/substantivalism
distinction will be found wanting in that the first of our timeless strategies would,
under its terms, be mis-classified as temporally substantivalist; and iii) The sec-
ond of our timeless strategies will be argued to lead to a position which cannot
properly be understood in terms of relationalism or substantivalism with regard
to time but rather is found to be timeless in a fundamentally Parmenidian sense.
2The first originates with Kucharˇ ([1992]), Barbour ([1994]) and Foster (Barbour and Foster
[2009]). The second with Rovelli ([1990], [1991], [2002],[2004]) who was followed by Dittrich
([2006], [2008]) and Thiemann ([2007]).
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2 Mechanics with a fixed parameterisation
2.1 Lagrangian mechanics
We start with the specification of the set of n independent variables, qi where
i = 1...n, which serve to characterise the properties of a mechanical system.
These variables are elements of a manifold3 which we call the configuration
space, C0.4 At a given point q ∈ C0 we can define a tangent space TqC0. The
disjoint union of all the tangent spaces of C0 is called the tangent bundle TC0.
The elements of the tangent bundle are pairs (q, q˙) of configuration variables q
and vectors tangent to those variables q˙. For formulations of mechanics with a
fixed parameterisation the parameter with which the tangent vectors are defined
is unique and may be interpreted as time t (this will prove not to be the case
for the theories of mechanics considered in §4). Thus we have (q, q˙) ∈ TC0 with
q˙ = ∂q
∂t
.
A curve within the tangent bundle, γ0 : R→ TC0, will correspond to a history
of a system – a sequence of configurations and velocities. The parameterisation
of the curve will be fixed up to a choice of origin and unit by the distinguished
time parameter t. This parameter can be taken to vary monotonically along each
curve in configuration space. Clearly, for this picture to match up with the physics
of the real world we need some restriction on which histories are nomologically
possible. This is achieved by defining the Lagrangian, L0 : TC0 → R, and the
action, I[γ0] =
∫
γ0
L0[qi, q˙i]dt =
∫
γ0
(T − V )dt, where T and V are kinetic energy
and potential energy respectively. The extremisation of the action, δI[γ0] = 0, ac-
cording to the principle of least action leads to the Euler-Lagrange equations,
d
dt
(
∂L0
∂q˙i
)
= ∂L0
∂qi
, that specify a set of parameterised solutions, {γPS} ⊂ {γ0},
which uniquely determine the physically possible histories of the system given an
initial point in TC0.
2.2 Hamiltonian mechanics
An alternative formulation of mechanics in terms of first order equations is
achieved by moving to the cotangent bundle of our configuration manifold, the
phase space Γ0 = T
∗C0. This is the disjoint union of all the cotangent spaces
T ∗q C0. A point in phase space, (q, p), consists of a point in our original config-
uration space, q ∈ C0, paired with a covector at q, p ∈ T ∗q C0. These covectors,
which we call the conjugate momenta, are given by the Legendre transformation,
FL : TC0 → T ∗C0, which is the map between the configuration-velocity space
and the phase space. It can be explicitly constructed using the definition of the
canonical momenta, pi =
∂L
∂q˙i
. To fix the dynamics we introduce the Hamilto-
nian functional, H0[qi, pi] = p
iqi − L = T + V , and derive Hamilton’s equations,
p˙i = −∂H0∂qi and q˙i = ∂H0∂pi . The relevant parameterised solutions γ¯PS describe
3Those unfamiliar with the terminology of differential geometry are suggested to refer to
(Baez and Muniain [1994]) or (Butterfield [2007]) for a detailed introduction
4The subscript 0 is used to distinguish the objects introduced here from those of the extended
description of mechanics given in §4.
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the system’s dynamics uniquely in the phase space Γ0 and are isomorphic to the
solutions γPS in the configuration-velocity space TC0.
2.3 Symplectic mechanics
An elegant and powerful characterisation of mechanical systems is provided by
the symplectic approach (Abraham and Marsden [1978]; Arnold [1988]; Souriau
[1997]). Symplectic is a Greek word first introduced in this context by Herman
Weyl ([1939]). It means roughly ‘plaited together’ or ‘woven’. A symplectic
approach to mechanics involves the generalised description of the phase space
used above in terms of a natural geometric language with the canonical momenta
and configuration variables explicitly represented as woven together.
Above we defined a covector as the dual of a tangent vector, similarly we can
define a cotangent vector field or one-form as the dual of a tangent vector field.
We can generalise these objects to define a k-form as a smooth section of the kth
exterior power of the cotangent bundle, Ωk(T ∗M), of a manifold M . Of particular
interest are two-forms which are functions Ω(x) : TxM × TxM → R that assign
to each point x ∈M a skew-symmetric bilinear form on the tangent space TxM to
M at x (Marsden and Ratiu [1994]). We can transform a k-form into a k+1-form
by the action of the exterior derivative, d : Ωk(Γ0)→ Ωk+1(Γ0). It is such that
df = df , d(dα) = 0 and d(fα) = df ∧α+ fdα where α is a k-form and df is the
differential of f .
Given a general cotangent bundle, T ∗M , we can always define a corresponding
Poincare´ one-form5, θ, in terms of a sum of products between a covector and
the total differential of the vector it is paired with. Thus for our phase space, Γ0,
the Poincare´ one form is θ = pidq
i. If we then take the exterior derivative we get
a two form:
ω0 = dθ = d(pidq
i) = dpi ∧ dqi (1)
This two form is called a symplectic two form and is both closed (dω0 = 0)
and non-degenerate (if ω0(Xf , Xg) = 0 for all Xf ∈ TM then Xg = 0). A man-
ifold endowed with a symplectic two form constitutes a symplectic geometry
(M,ω0). Significantly, if we are given a smooth function, f , on a manifold en-
dowed with a symplectic two form then we immediately define uniquely a smooth
tangent vector field Xf through the map f 7−→ Xf given to us by ω0(Xf , ·) = df .
The uniqueness of the vector field is guaranteed by the non-degeneracy of ω0.
The relation between symplectic geometry and the Hamiltonian theory of
mechanics outlined above can be seen immediately since Hamilton’s equations
can be written:
(q˙1, ..., q˙n, p˙1, ...p˙n)
(
0 I
−I 0
)
=
(
∂H0
∂q1
, ...,
∂H0
∂qn
,
∂H0
∂p1
, ...,
∂H0
∂pn
)
(2)
where I is the n × n identity matrix. This expression is an unknown vector
multiplied by a matrix and set equal to known vector. It is equivalent to
ω0(XH0 , ·) = dH0 (3)
5See (von Westenholz [1978], pp. 392-4) for more details.
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which is an unknown tangent vector field (the Hamiltonian vector field XH) con-
tracted with a two form and set equal to the exterior derivative of a the Hamil-
tonian, H. Thus we can see Hamilton’s equations have an immediate connection
with symplectic geometry. The dynamics of a system can be totally specified by
the triple (Γ0, ω0, H0), where Γ0 is our phase space manifold (cotangent bundle),
ω0 is the symplectic two form, and H0 is the Hamiltonian function on Γ0. To-
gether these three elements fix the value of the Hamiltonian vector field, XH0 .
It is the integral curves of this vector field that correspond to the parameterised
phase space solutions γ¯PS that we associated with the physical histories above.
The Hamiltonian vector field that we have just defined is unique. This implies
that it will generate a unique R-action on phase space.6 This R-action, and the
associated flow, are what we conventionally identify as temporal evolution since
they take us from a point in phase space (instantaneous state of a physical system)
to a second point (state) that is t units along a solution (physical history). Thus,
we see that there is a intimate connection between the Hamiltonian and time.
This connection is made even more explicit by the introduction of the Poisson
bracket, which is a special case of the Lie bracket, that can be defined via
the symplectic two form for any pair of functions, f, g ∈ C∞(Γ0), as {f, g} :=
ω0(Xf , Xg). The Poisson bracket can be related to the action of a vector field on
a smooth function {f, g} = Xg(f) ≡ df(Xg) ≡ LXg(f). This means that if we
take the Poisson bracket of the Hamiltonian with an arbitrary smooth function
we will get the change of this function along the flow defined by the Hamiltonian
vector field. This is equal to the variation of the function with respect to the
flow parameter of XH0 which is, of course, how change with respect to time is
represented:
{f,H0} = XH0(f) =
df
dt
= f˙ (4)
Conversely, the commutation condition {f,H0} = 0 indicates that a function is
conserved – it does not change with respect to time.
2.4 Presymplectic geometry and symplectic reduction
A physical system within which a Lie group, G, acts on the tangent bundle,
TC0, such that the Lagrangian, L, is invariant and the group is local (i.e. it
can be parameterised in a natural way by a family of arbitrary functions on
space-time) is said to display a gauge symmetry. In such systems the assumption
that the Legendre transformation is an isomorphism which was implicit in our
construction of mechanics above no longer holds. This is because the bijectivity
of the map FL : TC0 → T ∗C0 is dependent on the Lagrangian being such that
it determines tangent vectors q˙ uniquely through the definition of the canonical
momenta. Gauge symmetries g ∈ G manifestly subvert this since we have that
L(q′, q˙′) = L(gq, gq˙) = L(q, q˙) for ∀g ∈ G. In phase space terms the existence of a
gauge symmetry group corresponds to the pi’s and qi’s not all being independent
6The additive real group, R, allows us to define an R-action as Φ : R ×M → M . We
associate it with a one parameter group of diffeomorphisms from M to M called a flow {αt}
through the relation αt(x) = Φ(t, x) for x ∈M .
7
- there exists some functional relationship between them of the form ϕ(p, q) = 0.
We call such functions constraints.7
Geometrically we can understand the collection of all the constraints, ϕj where
j = 1, ...m, as defining an m-dimensional sub-manifold, Σ = {(p, q) ∈ Γ0|∀j :
ϕj(p, q) = 0}, within phase space, Γ0, that we call the constraint surface. The
phase space itself will, as in the unconstrained case, have a symplectic geometry
characterised by the pair (Γ0, ω) – where ω is again a closed and non-degenerate
two form constructed by taking the total differential of the Poincare´ one form
θ = pidq
i. However, points in this space which do not lie on the constraint surface
will not correspond to physically possible states since they constitute solutions
which violate the gauge symmetry (they are inaccessible or merely unphysical in
the language of Rickles [2004] p.177). It is the geometry particular to the class
of points lying on the constraint surface that is nomologically significant.
We can characterise the geometry of the constraint surface explicitly by first
restricting θ to Σ to get a new characteristic one form, θ˜ = θ|Σ . The total deriva-
tive of θ˜ will then give us a two form ω˜ = dθ˜ which endows the constraint manifold
with the geometry (Σ, ω˜). This new two form will be closed but whether it is
degenerate or not depends on the particular properties of the constraint surface
itself. In cases where it is non-degenerate we again have a symplectic geome-
try and the dynamics is as described above only now with the triple (Σ, ω˜, H˜0)
defining the system (where H˜0 : Σ→ R is the restriction of H0 to Σ).
In the case that ω˜ is degenerate, however, we have a presymplectic geome-
try and our regular description of dynamics is no longer available to us. This is
because presymplectic geometries have a degenerate structure that does not allow
us to associate a unique vector field with every smooth function. This means that
we are not provided with a straightforward characterisation of time evolution ei-
ther via a unique R-action or by the usual Poisson bracket with the Hamiltonian.
Even more worryingly, the existence of local symmetry groups allows for inde-
terministic (or more properly underdetermined) evolution since at a given point
the degeneracy of the Hamiltonian vector field allows for multiple mathematically
distinct but dynamically equivalent solutions irrespective of the path leading up
to that point. Thus, it would seem that the degeneracy inherent in presymplectic
geometries is of a pernicious variety such that we can no longer establish a direct
representational relationship between the relevant mathematical and ontological
objects – there is no longer a one-to-one correspondence between the phase space
solutions and the physical histories which are distinguished by unique values of
the action and so our theory is underdetermined.
To get a better hold on the nature of this degeneracy we can define the null
tangent vector space Nx ⊂ TxΣ as the collection of vectors that satisfy the equa-
tion ω˜(X, ·) = 0. This is equivalent to the null space or kernel, Ker(ω˜), of the
presymplectic form. A kernel of dimension greater than zero is characteristic of
the non-trivial structure of the presymplectic form just as a kernel of dimension
equal to zero is characteristic of the trivial structure of the symplectic form. An
equivalence relation between two points x, y ∈ Σ can be defined based upon the
7These particular constraints are known as primary constraints. See footnote 11 for details.
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condition of being joined by a curve, γ¯ : R→ Σ, with null tangent vectors. Sets
of points for which this equivalence relation holds are sub-manifolds called gauge
orbits, [x], and we say that the action of our presymplectic form is to partition
phase space into these orbits. Equivalently we can say that the orbits are de-
fined by the integral curves of the null vector field of ω˜. The non-uniqueness
that we understood in terms of the existence of gauge orbits is, therefore, also
characterised by Ker(ω˜).
Critically for our purposes the quotient ΠR = Σ/Ker(ω˜) will necessarily be
both symplectic and a manifold. The first is assured since the quotient is with
respect to a sectional foliation.8 The second is assured because the quotient is
of a presymplectic manifold with respect to the kernel of its own presymplectic
form and it can be shown that this implies that the resulting quotient manifold
will be endowed with a closed two form with a kernel of zero dimension – i.e. it
will have a symplectic geometry.9 We can now represent evolution in terms of a
unique R-action defined in ΠR. We call ΠR the reduced phase space and using
the projection map pi : Σ→ ΠR can define the symplectic geometry (ΠR, ωR, HR)
where ωR is the two form whose pullback to Σ by pi is ω˜ (i.e. ω˜ = pi
∗ωR where
pi∗ : ΠR → Σ). An equation of the form ωR(XHR , ·) = dHR then gives us a unique
Hamiltonian vector field along with the associated Poisson bracket and R-action
that allows us to uniquely represent both time and the physical histories uniquely
within our formalism.
The pullback by pi also allows us to consider the properties that smooth func-
tions on the reduced phase space will have with respect to the constraint manifold.
Given such a function, fR ∈ C∞(ΠR), we can define fΣ ∈ C∞(Σ), by fΣ = pi∗fR.
Since points connected by a gauge orbit on Σ will be represented by a single
point on ΠR we have that fΣ will be constant along such gauge orbits. We can
also talk about functions on the full phase space as being constant along gauge
orbits. Since the constraints are by definition functions of the form ϕj : Γ0 → 0
the symplectic form on phase space will associate them each with a vector field
Xϕj . If we then take the Poisson bracket between them and an arbitrary func-
tion, f ∈ C∞(Γ0), we will have {f, ϕj} = ω(Xf , Xϕj). On the constraint surface
it must be the case that the Xϕj coincide with the null vector fields N – the
integral curves of which are the gauge orbits. So, given that on the constraint
surface f must be a function which is unchanging along the gauge orbits, the
definition of the Poisson bracket implies that the expression {f, ϕj} must vanish
on the constraint surface – i.e. we have that {f, ϕj} ≈ 0, where the weak equality
is understood to mean vanishing upon the constraint surface.
We can therefore distinguish a class of functions on phase space, Dirac-
Bergmann observables, by the satisfaction of three equivalent conditions:
1. Constancy along gauge orbits on the constraint manifold
2. Weakly commuting with all the constraints
8See (Souriau [1997], p.42 and pp. 82-3). It is a sectional foliation because the orbits which
partition Σ constitute manifolds which are suitably transverse.
9See (Souriau [1997], theorem 9.10).
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3. Equivalence to a function on the reduced phase space
The name observable seems sensible since it is only these functions that are
specified uniquely for every value of the flow parameter defined by the vector
field generated by the reduced Hamiltonian, HR. Thus, given our reliance on
an underlying symplectic structure to define time, precise restrictions are placed
upon the mathematical objects with which we would want to associate physical
quantities.
This idea of passing from a presymplectic to a symplectic manifold by quoti-
enting with respect to the kernel of the presymplectic form is what we will call
symplectic reduction and has an important connection10 with Dirac’s theory of
constraints. In particular, in cases (such as those considered in the next section)
where there is only one primary constraint and no secondary constraints11 the
application of symplectic reduction is identical to following the Dirac procedure
in that it leads to the same conditions on observable functions we have just out-
lined. A theory in which all first class primary constraints are gauge generating
is said to obey Dirac’s theorem (Barbour and Foster [2009]) and we can therefore
say that the applicability of symplectic reduction is equivalent to satisfaction of
Dirac’s theorem in all theories with a single primary constraint.
3 Reductionism, Haecceitism and gauge sym-
metry
The identification between gauge theories treated according to Dirac’s constraint
procedure and the re-construction of such theories in terms of reduced phase
spaces arrived at via symplectic reduction has important interpretational con-
sequences. As we have seen above conventional Hamiltonian mechanics can be
characterised in terms of a phase space which has a symplectic geometry and
within which solutions (the integral curves of the Hamiltonian vector field) are
in one-to-one correspondence with physical histories. In these circumstances it
seems natural to identify the phase space as a possibility space since each point
can be considered to represent a distinct possible instantaneous physical state
and each curve a distinct possible physical history. On the other hand, when we
have a constrained Hamiltonian system the relevant phase space is clearly not
a suitable candidate for a possibility space it contains inaccessible points (i.e.
those not on the constraint surface) which can not be thought of as representing
physically possible states. Furthermore, even if we exclude such points and focus
on the physical section of phase space (i.e. consider only points on the constraint
surface) then we again do not have a natural candidate for a possibility space
since the weaker presymplectic geometry only equips us with an equivalence class
of solutions corresponding to each physical history. This leaves the theory open
10See (Gotay et al. [1978]) and (Pons et al. [1999]) for explicit examination of this connection.
11Primary constraints are those that arise directly from the fact that the conjugate momenta
are not independent functions of the velocities. Secondary constraints arise from the application
of consistency conditions that ensure the primary constraints are conserved.
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to pernicious underdetermination such that if points are identified as representing
distinct instantaneous states then specifying an initial sequences of states fails to
uniquely determine future states. Since the class of classical constrained Hamil-
tonian theories features theories, such as electromagnetism, which are manifestly
deterministic in the sense of giving unique predictions for all measurable quanti-
ties the appearance of indeterminism should be seen to be interpreted as a sign of
inadequacy in our standard representative formalism12 – we cannot identify the
constraint surface as a possibility space in a conventional sense.
Rather, we could treat it as an unconventional possibility space by weaken-
ing the representational connection between points on the constraint surface and
instantaneous states. The classic philosophical strategy to enable such a weak-
ening would be to adopt a position that disavows Haecceitism. Following Lewis
([1983]), we can designate as Haecceitists those who admit ‘nonqualitative de-
terminants of cross-identification’ (p.19) between entities or objects in distinct
worlds or structures. To adopt such a position is to allow for real differences
which are only with respect to which objects play which role within the struc-
ture; since one is allowed to cross-identify each of a pair of qualitatively identical
objects whose roles are permuted between two structures, we may ground a non-
qualitative differentiation of the structures in terms of the cross-identification of
the objects. The standard literal way of interpreting a possibility space—i.e. each
point represents a distinct instantaneous state—can be understood in terms of
Haecceitism. We can seen this since: i) The literal interpretation licences us to
consider as distinct two histories represented by sequences of points which differ
solely with respect to a gauge transformation; ii) Such a difference is only with
regard to which instantaneous states (represented by points) play which roles;
iii) This means that if we take a history to be the relevant structure and in-
stantaneous states (labelled by the points to which they correspond) to be the
relevant objects, then the ontological difference between gauge related histories
in the literal interpretation can be naturally cashed out in Haecceitistic terms.13
When applied to the constraint manifold of a gauge theory (such as elec-
tromagnetism) such an approach becomes problematic because its combination
with the presence of pernicious underdetermination forces us into interpreting an
empirically deterministic theory as ontologically indeterministic – two sequences
of instantaneous states can initially coincide but then differ in a real but non-
qualitative manner as determined by a purely haecceitistic differentiation.14 An
anti-Haecceitist, on the other hand, denies the possibility of non-qualitative de-
terminants of cross-identification and so will disavow exactly the haecceitistic
12As pointed out by Belot and Earman ([2001] p.8) the only other alternative in such circum-
stances would be to accept that there exist physically real quantities that are not measurable.
Although potentially consistent, this would seem like a very unnatural approach and would
require us to construct a highly unorthodox account of the concept of measurement.
13This is not to imply that there many not be other methodologies to ground such differences.
For example Butterfield’s ([1988]) response to the hole argument in general relativity makes use
of counterpart theory rather than Haecceitism to establish a non-qualitative yet ontologically
significant difference between gauge related histories.
14See (Belot [2003], §7) and (Belot and Earman ([2001] §2.3) for explicit treatment of the
electromagnetic case.
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differentiation that allows for two gauge related sequences of points in a possibil-
ity space to represent distinct structures.15 Thus, by adopting anti-Haecceitism
we can relieve ourselves of the burden of having to endorse ontological indetermin-
ism by instituting a many-to-one relationship between gauge related sequences of
points on the constraint surface and the unique sequences of instantaneous states
they represent.
Although providing space for a viable interpretation of the possibility space
structure found in gauge theory the anti-Haecceitist approach does nothing about
removing what would seem like superfluous mathematical structure – to dispense
with this surplus structure we need to move to the reduced phase space. Now,
this space has obvious interpretational benefits since, as seen above, if all goes
well the reduced space will be a symplectic manifold with the integral curves of
the reduced Hamiltonian vector field naturally identified as representing physi-
cal histories and points as representing physically distinct instantaneous states.
Thus the reduced space will, by definition, not feature any underdetermination
associated with gauge symmetry and if we endow it with the privileged status
as our fundamental possibility arena we reap the reward of recovering the abil-
ity to use our conventional representational scheme for theories which display
gauge symmetry. Since we have regained a one-to-one correspondence between
possibility space points and physically distinguishable instantaneous states the
Haecceitism/anti-Haecceitism distinction discussed above becomes less signifi-
cant. The superiority of, when possible, reduction as an interpretational stance
has been advocated principally by Gordon Belot and John Earman (Belot [1996],
[2000], [2003], [2003]; Earman [2002]; Belot and Earman [1999],[2001]). We will
call it the reductionism with regard to constrained Hamiltonian theory and a
close association can be made between it and Dirac’s theorem as defined above
– in fact, it would seem fair to say that the reductive philosophical stance is the
natural interpretational consequence of a strict reading of Dirac’s theorem. Ar-
guments towards the non-applicability of symplectic reduction (corresponding to
Dirac’s theorem) for the specific case of nonrelativistic reparameterisation invari-
ant mechanics will be the major preoccupation of the next section. §5 will then
focus on techniques for representing time and change within the unreduced phase
space before we will return, in §6, to interpretational issues connected with both
reductionism/anti-reductionism and Haecceitism/anti-Haecceitism.
4 Reparameterisation invariant mechanics
4.1 Extended Lagrangian mechanics
The description of mechanics and gauge symmetry given thus far has made use
of a distinguished background parameter; time t. Within the Lagrangian scheme
this parameter was associated with both the tangent vectors or velocities, q˙ = ∂q
∂t
15They need not, however, also deny primitive identity of the objects concerned (i.e. instan-
taneous states) since such primitive identity may be conceived of contextually. See (Ladyman
[2007]) on this point.
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∈ TC0, and with the preferred parameterisation of the solutions, γPS : R→ TC0.
An alternative methodology for constructing a mechanical theory is to instead
treat time as an additional coordinate, q0 = t, in a n+ 1 dimensional extended
configuration space, C = R × C0. Velocities in this space are then defined for
all of the qµ ∈ C by differentiation with respect to an arbitrary parameter τ so
we have that q′µ =
dqµ
dτ
, (qµ, q
′
µ) ∈ TC. This arbitrary parameter is also taken to
vary monotonically along curves in extended configuration space, γ : R → TC.
Following Lanzcos ([1966], §5)16 we can use an extended Lagrangian, Lex[qµ, q′µ] :
TC → R to define an action of the form:
I =
∫
γ
dτLex[qµ, q
′
µ] =
∫
γ
dτ(
T¯
q′0
− q′0V ) (5)
where T¯ = q′20 T and all masses are set to unity.
An important property of the extended Lagrangian is that it is homogenous
of degree one in the extended set of velocities q′µ: for some positive number k
the transformation q′µ → kq′µ implies Lex[qµ, q′µ]→ kLex[qµ, q′µ]. This means that
the action of our theory will be invariant under re-scalings of the parameter τ .
Theories which display such a dynamic insensitivity to parameterisation are said
to be reparameterisation invariant. The interpretation of this theory will be
non-standard since reparameterisation is a symmetry of the action which maps
between distinct solutions in the extended configuration space – this is because
the velocities are parameterisation dependent. Thus these solutions cannot be
used to provide a straightforward characterisation of physical histories as in §3.1.
4.2 Extended Hamiltonian mechanics
In correspondence with §3.2 we can define an extended phase space as the cotan-
gent bundle to our extended configuration manifold, (qµ, pµ) ∈ Γ = T ∗C =T ∗(R×
C0), with pµ = ∂Lex∂q′µ . The relevant Hamiltonian functional, Hex[qµ, pµ] : Γ→ R
takes the form:
Hex[qµ, pµ] = p
µq′µ − Lex[qµ, q′µ] (6)
which is homogenous of degree one in the set of extended velocities and defines
a reparameterisation invariant action
I =
∫
γ
dτ(pµq′µ −Hex[qµ, pµ]) (7)
By definition we have that the momentum conjugate to time is:
p0 =
∂Lex
∂q′0
= L0 − ∂L0
∂q˙i
q′i
t′
= −H0 (8)
which means the extended Hamiltonian is equivalent to:
Hex[qµ, pµ] = t
′(p0 +H0) (9)
= 0
16Also see (Johns [2005], §11-12) and (Rovelli [2005], §3.1).
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The Hamiltonian is therefore a constraint and the dynamics of our theory will be
defined upon a surface within extended phase space, Σ = {x ∈ Γ : Hex(x) = 0}.
The geometry of the constraint surface is given (as above) by taking the restriction
of the relevant Poincare´ one form, θ = pµdq
µ, to Σ:
θ|Σ = pidqi −H0dt (10)
and taking the total differential to get a two form ω˜ = d(θ|Σ) with highly non-
trivial structure.17
Significantly, this two form is closed and degenerate. Thus the dynamics of
extended mechanics is framed within a presymplectic geometry, (Σ, ω˜). That this
should be the case can be seen quite simply since our definition of a degenerate
two form is equivalent to Hamilton’s equations of motion with a zero Hamiltonian:
ω˜(X, ·) = dHex (11)
= 0 (12)
The immediate consequence of the degeneracy is that no unique Hamiltonian
vector field is defined within the constraint surface and thus that we cannot define
a unique temporal R-action or flow. Correspondingly, our equation of motion (12)
is only solvable up to an arbitrary factor18 meaning that the dynamical solutions
can only be unparameterised curves in the tangent bundle γ¯UPS.
The question is then; can we now simply follow a symplectic reduction pro-
cedure and then avail ourselves of the standard description of time, change and
observable functions? Or does reparameterisation have some unusual feature that
necessitates a different approach? To tackle these issues we need to take a closer
look at the physical interpretation of both time and its conjugate momentum and
in doing so construct a more elegant and general version of reparameterisation
invariant mechanics.
4.3 Jacobi’s principle and timeless theory
We can associate the time coordinate t (q0) in extended mechanics with the value
taken by a clock external to our mechanical system. In the case of an open
system such an interpretation would seem appropriate; but what about if the
system is a closed subsystem of the universe? – or even the universe as a whole?
In this case there is clearly no physical basis for an external clock and as such
we would look to eliminate t as an independent variable. We can do this by the
process of Routhian reduction19 which serves to eliminate a cyclic independent
variable (i.e. one which only appears in the Lagrangian as a velocity) by using the
equations of motion to set its conjugate momentum equal to a constant. Since
17This should come as no surprise as this two form must encode the full structure of the
constraint and, since this constraint is the Hamiltonian, therefore the dynamics.
18This is because it can be thought of as a linear homogenous equation which only determines
the velocities up to a scaling factor applied everywhere along a solution.
19A fuller discussion of Routhian reduction in general, and in this case in particular, is given
in (Lanzcos [1966], §5) and (Arnold [1988], §3.s2).
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we have seen above that the conjugate momentum to time is equal to minus the
un-extended Hamiltonian of the system we will give the physical interpretation
of the constant involved as minus the total energy, E, of the system. Setting the
energy as equal to a constant is of course justified for a closed system. Explicitly,
following Lanzcos ([1966], §5), the Jacobi action is given by
I =
∫
γ0
dτ2
√
(E − V )T (13)
This action can be understood as defining geodesics in the un-extended space,
TC0, without making any reference to time or parameterisation – as such it is
reparameterisation invariant. We can define the lapse as:
N =
√
T
(E − V ) (14)
The Jacobi Hamiltonian (Barbour and Foster [2009], p.7), HJ : T
∗C0→ R can
then be expressed as:
HJ =
∑
i
pi.q
′
i − LJ = Nh (15)
where
h =
1
2
∑
i
pi.pi + V − E = 0 (16)
This is again a first class primary constraint. In fact it is the same constraint
as was encountered in extended mechanics merely with p0 replaced by −E and
the multiplier t′ replaced by N . Thus, reparameterisation invariant theories of
mechanics have a Hamiltonian of the form
H = Nh (17)
where N is a arbitrary multiplier, the choice of which determines the parameter-
isation, and h is some function of the conjugate variables that is equal to zero.
Such timeless theories will inevitably be constrained Hamiltonian theories with
the Hamiltonian itself playing the role of the constraint. Thus the geometry of
the constraint surface will be dictated by the two form ω = dθ = d(θ|Σ) where
Σ = {x ∈ Γ : H = 0}.
This two form will in general be closed and it will also be degenerate since
it has a null direction associated with the Hamiltonian constraint. The integral
curves of this vector are the gauge orbits of ω on Σ. However, since this null vector
field on the constraint surface is generated by the Hamiltonian we could also argue
that ω(X) = 0 is the equation of motion.20 Since the integral curves of the kernel
of the presymplectic form can be shown to be unique solutions we have the strange
20This can be explicitly seen for the case of the simple pendulum system used by Rovelli
([2004]) to illustrate both extended mechanics (§3.1 pp. 104-5) and Jacobi’s theory (§3.2 pp.109-
11) – n.b. he refers to the latter non-standardly as relativistic mechanics.
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situation in timeless mechanics where the gauge orbits correspond to the physical
histories! The question of how we are to interpret such a perplexing description
of mechanics, where degeneracy and dynamics are so closely interwoven, is far
from trivial and shall occupy us for the remained of this paper. To go forward,
however, we must go back and reconsider the connection between presymplectic
geometry and local symmetry groups.
4.4 Degeneracy, indeterminacy and triviality
In our initial discussion of presymplectic geometry we associated the degeneracy
encountered with a group of local or gauge symmetries arising on the tangent
bundle to some configuration-velocity space, TC. These symmetries were taken
to be such that they allow for multiple points to be associated with the same value
of the Lagrangian and thus ensured that the Legendre map, FL : TC → T ∗C, was
not an isomorphism (a bijective homomorphism) since in such a situation it will
generically neither be injective nor surjective. In the case of reparameterisation
invariant theory the relevant symmetry group is of course that of reparameterisa-
tions. It can be seen to be different to the generic gauge group considered in §3.4
in two important respects. First, since it relates curves that differ in terms of pa-
rameterisation it is strictly a symmetry of the action rather than the Lagrangian.
Second, although it also leads to a Legendre transformation that is again not
bijective (since it is not injective) the action of the reparameterisation group is
such that the conjugate momenta are not effected by rescaling the parameter.
Thus, distinct points on the tangent bundle which can be mapped from one to
another by the action of the reparameterisation group will correspond to single
points on the cotangent bundle. The structure of our phase space is therefore
such that paths through it are invariant under reparameterisations. The degen-
eracy present does not then lead to the type of pernicious underdetermination
which was encountered in the construction of presymplectic mechanics considered
in §3.4. Rather it takes us between vector fields that are equivalent up to scaling
by a multiplicative factor corresponding to the parameterisation. Our primary
motivation for the application of the symplectic reduction procedure is therefore
removed since there is no possibility of pernicious indeterminism.
We still, however, have the problem of representing change within the presym-
plectic constraint surface (Σ, ω) – one would like to be able to associate the Hamil-
tonian with a unique vector field and therefore be able to establish a unique flow
with which we can associate evolution. The most obvious way to do this would
be to find an underlying symplectic manifold within the timeless theory – thus
it may be worth trying to symplectically reduce such theories even without a
pressing theoretical need to. However, as pointed out above, timeless theories
have a geometry such that what we would normally call the gauge orbits (since
they are the sets of points connected by parameterisation rescalings) are also the
usual candidates for the solutions in phase space (since they are generated by the
Hamiltonian). Thus, the reduction procedure whereby we quotient out the orbits
of ω, will leave us with a reduced phase space, ΠR = Σ/Ker(ω), without any
meaningful notion of evolution – it consists of unconnected points each of which
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can only gain meaning when referred back to the entire history on the constraint
surface to which they correspond. Moreover, since the space is equipped only with
a trivial Hamiltonian function there is no sense in which the reduced phase space
symplectic form, ωR, found in reparameterisation invariant theories of mechanics
can play any meaningful role – even in generating maps between points in the
reduced space. Thus, representationally ΠR alone is only equipped to describe
trivial universes consisting of one static configuration (Maudlin ([2002]) makes a
similar point). Furthermore, since ωR is defined only in virtue of the constraint
surface via ω = pi∗ωR there is a sense in which it could be said to have no more
than a purely formal existence.21
It could be argued (Belot [2007], p.78) in this context that points in the
reduced phase space should be taken to describe entire dynamic solutions and
therefore that the space is not representationally trivial. In normal circumstances
it is reasonable to interpret the reduced phase space, ΠR, resulting from the
application of symplectic reduction as a space of instantaneous initial data states,
I. This follows from the fact that for any curve γPS in the space of gauge invariant
solutions to the Euler-Lagrange equations SR we can define a set of isomorphisms
between ΠR and SR such that for each value of the curve’s parameterisation there
will be a map uniquely picking out a point in ΠR with corresponding value of the
Hamiltonian flow parameter.22 However, for the case of nonrelativistic23 timeless
theory there is only a single canonical isomorphism defined between points in the
reduced phase space and the unparameterised gauge invariant solutions, γUPS.
Thus we can see why one might think the representational role of ΠR should be
modified such that it becomes identical to that of SR. But such a move has highly
nontrivial consequences for how we must interpret the unreduced phase space and
is therefore difficult to countenance. In particular, if xR ∈ ΠR is a solution then
given a point on the constraint manifold in the unreduced phase space, x ∈ Σ,
we must interpret the relevant ‘gauge’ orbit, [x] : Σ→ R, as an equivalence class
of solutions. This interpretation cannot hold since these orbits are equivalent
to solutions themselves rather than equivalence classes of solutions. Thus, in
nonrelativistic timeless theory at least, the representational role of the reduced
phase space cannot be in describing entire histories – we cannot treat it as a
primitive arena for representing our fundamental ontology. Rather, any status it
can be given as a history space is purely parasitic on the pull-back map to the
unreduced space and it is fallacious to argue that the isomorphism that exists
between SR and ΠR must confer representational equivalence between these two
very different mathematical structures.
It would seem therefore that we have established two examples of mechanical
theory within which the presence of a first class constraint does not indicate
that a symplectic reduction is appropriate. This means that Dirac’s theorem
21Rovelli’s ([2005]) treatment introduces ωR as ωph (p.111) but fails to make any use of it.
22The geometric structure of such a reduced space of solutions as well as its connection with
the Hamiltonian framework is extensively discussed in (Belot [2007]).
23In this respect general relativity would seem to be identical to nonrelativistic theory. Belot’s
argument (which was designed for application to GR) is explicitly re-examined for the case of
relativistic theory in (The´bault [2011], §3) and (The´bault [in preparation]).
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(first class constraints generate gauge symmetry) does not hold for the timeless
theories considered and is therefore not generally valid in its original form.24
5 Representing change and observables in time-
less mechanics
The essential point established by our argument thus far is that the unreduced
phase space of a timeless system (i.e. one in which the Hamiltonian is a con-
straint) is such that we cannot interpret it using the convectional machinery of
constrained Hamiltonian mechanics. Although, as in the generic case, points not
on the constraint surface must be classified as inaccessible states, it has been
demonstrated that, unlike in the generic case, the difference between points con-
nected by the orbits generated by the constraint on the constraint surface itself
cannot be classified as purely unphysical gauge without trivialising the theory.
Thus, the geometric structure of timeless theories leads us into an acute prob-
lem of representing change since we cannot avail ourselves of the conventional
temporal machinery provided by a reduced phase space. The definition of a
Dirac-Begmann observable also becomes ambiguous within timeless theory since
by application of the third condition from §3.4 observable functions must be
equivalent to single points on our reduced phase space – and this would seem to
trivialise them. Furthermore, the first condition (constancy along gauge orbits on
the constraint manifold) can only be satisfied in the case of phase space functions
which are constant along entire histories of the system and it is difficult to see
how such functions—perennials in the terminology of Kucharˇ ([1992])—could be
used to represent dynamic physical quantities since they cannot change along the
solutions defined by the Hamiltonian on the constraint surface. Thus we are also
presented with a problem of representing observables. This section will outline
and evaluate two methodologies each designed to meet our two problems for the
case of nonrelativistic theory.
5.1 The emergent time strategy
That the Hamiltonian constraint in reparameterisation invariant theories should
be thought of as generating genuine change is a position that has been notably
defended by Kucharˇ ([1991]) and Barbour ([1994]); more recently it has been
outlined explicitly in (Barbour and Foster [2009]). We shall call it the Kucharˇ-
Barbour-Foster (KBF) position with regard to change. In keeping with our dis-
cussion in §4.4 it is an explicitly non-reductive strategy since it involves us treat-
ing the differences between points on the integral curves corresponding to the
Hamiltonian vector field as genuine physical change. Parallel, although logically
independent, to this position with regard to change is the view that observable
functions need not commute with the Hamiltonian – we shall call this view the
24Rather we should say that first class constraints indicate the presence of gauge symmetries
but need not necessarily be identified as the relevant generators. This point is in full agreement
with (Barbour and Foster [2009]).
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KBF position with regard to observables. This explicitly non-reductive strategy
characterises observables as full functions on the unreduced phase space which
are allowed to break all three of the Dirac-Bergmann criteria. Essential to the
practical viability of this position is the possibility of quantifying the change of an
observable in a gauge invariant manner and we shall here outline the methodology
for doing this uniquely by using an emergent notion of time following (Barbour
and Foster [2009]).
From above we have that a generic timeless Hamiltonian will be of the form:
H = Nh (18)
h(p, q) = 0 (19)
If we take a function on phase space g(p, q) which we would like to interpret
as corresponding to some physical quantity then, since the full phase space is
a symplectic manifold, we can define the Poisson bracket of this function with
the Hamiltonian function, {g,H}. This is equivalent to the Lie derivative of the
function with respect to the Hamiltonian vector field, LXH (g). Since the Lie
derivative is an operation on scalar functions that gives us the change of the
function along a vector field LXH (g) is equivalent to a real number representing
the rate of change of g along the Hamiltonian vector field with respect to an
arbitrary parameter τ :
δg
δτ
= {g,H} (20)
Thus an infinitesimal change in the function along the vector field is equivalent
to:
δg = δτ{g,H} (21)
= δt{g, h} (22)
where we have introduced the temporal increment δt = Ndτ . Crucially, we have
from the invariance of the canonical action that Ndτ must be invariant under
reparameterisations. Since the Poisson bracket must be a real number δg must
itself also be a reparameterisation invariant quantity. However, it cannot yet
be taken to represent the change in a physical quantity; we have not made any
restriction to the constraint surface so we have not excluded change that takes
us from accessible to inaccessible states. To resolve this we introduce the weak
inequality and the infinitesimal change of a dynamic variable along a physical
history can be then represented as:
δg ≈ Ndτ{g, h} (23)
We can put this result in the context of our geometric discussion since we have
that: i) The Hamiltonian can be taken to generate an equivalence class of vector
fields, XNh upon phase space
25; ii) The integral curves of each of the vector
fields will correspond to the same set of solutions only with a differently scaled
25We get an equivalence class rather than a unique field because the multiplier N is arbitrary.
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parameter τ marking out change along them; iii) A reparameterisation is then
the map between one vector field and another (between one solution and another)
by re-scalings τ . Such a change is between different objects both generated by
H but is not strictly generated by H itself. Thus it should come as no surprise
that there is a viable methodology for gauge invariantly using the vector fields
associated with the unreduced Hamiltonian to solve our problem of representing
both change and observables in timeless theory.
Although we now have a valid methodology for representing the change of a
function along a timeless solution there does still seem to be a problem. If we
were to consider astronomers in two nonidentical isolated sub-systems each using
these equations to describe the dynamics of their solar system, they would end
up arriving at two different measures of change since each will have to make an
arbitrary choice in the form of the lapse and parameter τ . However, if we make
the restriction that we are dealing with closed systems of fixed energy then we
are justified in fixing the form of the lapse in accordance with Jacobi’s theory –
i.e. such that N =
√
T
(E−V ) . This Jacobi lapse allows us to define a uniquely
distinguished and reparameterisation invariant Newtonian temporal increment26:
δt =
√
T
(E − V )dτ (24)
Furthermore, this Newtonian temporal increment is such that it can be defined
based purely upon change in the configuration variables as:
δt =
√
δqi.δqi
2(E − V ) (25)
and we can therefore represent the change in a function along a solution with-
out reference to the parameterisation. This means that we can treat time as
something which naturally emerges from the dynamics and is thus ontologically
secondary to the change of configuration variables.
5.2 The correlation strategy
An alternative, and perhaps more radical, methodology for representing change
and observables in timeless mechanics places emphasis on the idea of correla-
tions and may be traced back through a linage featuring famous names such as
DeWitt ([1967]), Bergmann ([1961]), and (arguably) Einstein ([1916]). Here we
will present a particular implementation of the correlation strategy which follows
on from Rovelli’s ([1990], [1991], [2002], [2004]) complete and partial observables
methodology and is due to Dittrich ([2006], [2007]) and Thiemann ([2007]). We
shall focus initially on this correlation strategy as addressing the problem of rep-
resenting observables in isolation from the problem of representing change and
26As pointed out by Barbour ([1994], §4) this privileged time measure derivable from dynamics
of a closed system is equivalent to the astronomers notion of ephemeris time.
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shall designate the position outlined as the Rovelli-Ditterich-Thiemann (RDT)
observables position.
An essential element of this scheme is the move away from a representation
of change in an observable as the variation of a phase space function along a his-
tory. Rather, we focus upon the configuration variables themselves (the partial
observables) and assert that the quantities we should be interested in endow-
ing with physical meaning are the relations between configuration variables (the
gauge invariant complete observables).27 Change in an observable can then be
represented as the reparameterisation invariant specification of the value of one
configuration variable with respect to another – as correlations between partial
observables. The complete observables are the families of correlation functions
which individually give the value of one of the partial observables when the other
(the clock variable) is equal to some real number.
A simple example will illustrate the important elements of this scheme. We
can consider a system described by two configuration variables (partial observ-
ables) q1 and q2 which together with their conjugate momenta obey a Hamiltonian
constraint of the form H[q1, q2, p1, p2] = 0. The phase space, (q1, q2, p1, p2) ∈ Γ,
will as usual have a symplectic structure. We can use the relevant symplectic
form to define the action of the Hamiltonian vector field on an arbitrary func-
tion, XH(f) = ω(Xf , XH) = {f,H}. The flow, ατH , generated by this vector
field can then be defined for every x ∈ Γ and we can see this flow as acting on a
phase space function, ατH(f)(x), such that it takes us along the solutions.
28 For
our system therefore we calculate ατH(q1)(q1, q2, p1, p2) and α
τ
H(q2)(q1, q2, p1, p2)
We then designate one of our variables as a clock variable and seek to invert an
expression of the form Tx(τ) = α
τ
H(q1)(x) such that solving Tx(τ) = s for s ∈ R
will give us an expression for τ in terms of s and q1. In general this inversion
will only be possible for a specific interval – thus the clock variables are typically
going to be at best locally well defined and so are unlikely to be continuous on
phase space and this means that the scheme will be difficult to implement in
practice. We can then insert the inverted expression into the second flow equa-
tion ατH(q2)(x) by substituting for τ , and produce an expression which (within
the interval specified) gives us the value of q2 when q1 takes the value s. This
complete observable represents a family of functions (one for each s) each of which
expresses the correlation between our two partial observables without reference
to parameterisation.
Importantly, not only are complete observables families of reparameterisation
invariant objects but the functions on phase space that each correlation defines
will commute with the Hamiltonian constraint. This means that they explicitly
fulfil the second condition for a Dirac-Bergmann observable and demonstrates
the fundamental difference between the RDT and KBF positions with regard to
observables. We can consider the extent to which the complete observables satisfy
the other two criteria. The first condition was that Dirac-Bergmann observables
are functions which are constant along the orbits generated by the constraint on
27There is some debate as to how we should interpret the partial observables see (Thiemann
([2007] p. 78), (Rickles [2008] pp.154-68) and (Rovelli [2007]).
28See (Dittirich [2007] eq. 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7) for explicit formulas.
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the constraint surface. By definition the flows generated by the Hamiltonian con-
straint in the phase space and the integral curves of the relevant null vector field
will coincide on the constraint surface. Since each of the correlations that make
up a complete observable are defined for a specific value of the flow parameter
these functions do not vary along this flow and are therefore constant along gauge
orbits. But it must be noted that the sense in which these functions satisfy this
condition is somewhat different from the generic case in two senses. First, in a
typical gauge theory an observable would be constant along gauge orbits but it
would also vary between them – it is this variation off the orbits that we would
normally consider physical change. Second, the sense in which they are constant
on gauge orbits is almost trivial – they are each defined for a particular value of
the flow parameter so in effect they establish the correlation at a particular point
along an orbit. Clearly such a specification is valid all the way along the orbit
only in the same strange sense that ‘in Sydney in 2011 AD, Caesar crossed the
Rubicon in 49 BC’ is a valid statement concerning modern Australian history.
Application of the third Dirac-Bergmann condition is more acutely problem-
atic. Since the functions that define them do not vary between gauge orbits
complete observables are each equivalent to single points rather than functions
on reduced phase space. This means that if we take the symplectic reduction on-
tologically seriously (i.e. treat the reduced phase space as primitive) we will only
be left with a single correlation specified by each complete observable rather than
an entire family of correlation functions since it is only through the pull back
to the constraint manifold that these correlations are defined. It would seem,
therefore, that there is some motivation for setting aside the Dirac-Bergmann
notion of an observable altogether – complete observables are defined in such a
way that it is no longer fully appropriate and the RDT position should be seen
as a distinct alternative rather than a innovative application of the orthodoxy.
We can now finally turn the the problem of change. Here we appear to have
a problem since Rovelli and Dittrich hold both that evolution generated by the
Hamiltonian is gauge29 and that the entire orbit it generates is what should
be considered physically real.30 If we dispense with the first proposition (which
clearly must contradict the non-reductive stance taken by these authors) and focus
on the second, then a coherent but highly radical position emerges. In particular,
if we consider the implications of the change in the notion of the physical state
that seems to have been made, then it appears that the RDT position with regard
to change in nonrelativistic reparameterisation invariant mechanics amounts to a
denial of the need for any fundamental concept of time at all.
Rovelli ([2002]) distinguishes the ‘physical phase space’ as the ‘space of orbits
generated by the constraints on the constraint surface’ (p3) and Dittrich ([2007])
similarly defines the physical state as an ‘equivalence class of phase space points’
which ‘can be identified with an n-dimensional gauge orbit’ (p 1894). For a
theory where the Hamiltonian is itself a constraint this constitutes a redefinition
29See Rovelli ([2004] p. 127) and Dittrich ([2007] p.1892). Thiemann’s ([2007] p.75) position
with regard to this point is more nuanced and is specifically targeted to the case of general
relativity.
30See (Rickles [2008] pp.182-6) and (Dittrich [2007] p.1894).
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of the structure of our dynamics such that the basic ontological entity is an entire
history rather than an instantaneous configuration. In typical gauge theories
points on the constraint surface connected by a gauge orbit are classified as the
same state because the difference between them is taken to be unphysical – we
can then proceed to a symplectically reduced phase space within which we can
characterise the change between two instantaneous states without problem. This
interpretation of change drawn from the complete observables scheme on the other
hand leads us to classify two such points as the same state because the word ‘state’
is redefined such that in includes all points on the orbit. This is not to classify
time or evolution as gauge since that would indicate that the trivial reduced
phase space of single initial data points was the arena of true physical significance.
Rather, it is to adopt a position such that any notions of evolution and time in
a conventional sense are redundant within reparameterisation invariant theory.
Adoption of a correlation strategy has then the capacity for radical philosophical
implications for the nature of time in physical theory – the next section will
examine these in more detail as well as considering the emergent time strategy
in a more philosophical context.
6 Interpretational implications
The more strictly analytical objective of this paper has been to demonstrate that,
unlike standard gauge theories, timeless nonrelativistic theories are such that the
constraints cannot be considered as gauge generators without trivialisation and
that a reduced phase space with a symplectic geometry cannot be considered as
both a viable and autonomous representative structure. In this context we have
examined two strategies for representing observables and change in the unreduced
phase space and considered some of the implications of each scheme. What now
concerns us are the interpretational consequences we should attach to our conclu-
sions. In particular, it is interesting to consider how we should place the existence
of: 1) gauge theories with phase spaces such that passage to a representatively
viable reduced space is not available; and 2) our two strategies for representing
change without an explicit notion of time; in the context of the debates over
both relationalism/substantivalism with respect to time and reductionism/non-
reductionism with respect to the interpretation of gauge theories.
6.1 The relationalist vs substantivalist dispute with re-
gard to time
The long standing relationalist/substantivalist dispute with regard to space and
motion in nonrelativistic mechanics contains many important lessons for the par-
allel dispute with regard to time. In particular, modern treatments in terms of
analytical mechanics allow us to precisely characterise a number of refinements
to the traditional binary distinction – we will very briefly introduce the ideas key
for our purpose, a more exhaustive analysis can be found in (Rickles [2008]).
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Let us define a substantivalist as someone who is committed to the exis-
tence of space (or space-time) as an entity in its own right, over and above the
relations that hold between material bodies. The position of straightforward sub-
stantivalism then involves a commitment to the existence of distinct spatial (or
space-time) models which differ only by the application of an element of the
Euclidean (Galilean) group of global symmetry transformations. The difference
between the two models is cashed out in Haecceitistic terms since it rests upon
the non-qualitative cross-identification between spatial points as the means of
differentiation. In terms of the Hamiltonian formulation of mechanics (where the
models are curves in phase space) this is to insist that sequences of points in
phase space which are related by symmetry transformations can represent dis-
tinct sequences of instantaneous states despite being distinguished only by which
individuals (in this case the instantaneous states) play which role in the relevant
structure – straightforward substantivalism thus involves taking a Haecceitist line
with regard to sequences of points within phase space as well as spatial points
within spatial models.
A sophisticated substantivalist is someone who maintains the commitment to
the ontological fundamentality of space (or space-time) but does not allow Haec-
ceitism and therefore does not insist that models related by symmetry transfor-
mations are distinct – rather the individual spatial points are multiply realised
within symmetry related models. Since we do not allow non-qualitative determi-
nants of cross-identification between spatial points across models we disavow the
differentiation between these models along Haecceitist lines. Furthermore, within
a Hamiltonian framework (where again the instantaneous states are the individu-
als and phase space curves the models) sophisticated substantivalism involves the
view that although space is a fundamental entity, symmetry related sequences of
points represent the same structure since they only differ as to which individuals
play which roles. We can therefore understand sophisticated substantivalism in
terms of an anti-Haecceitist position with regard to sequences of points within
phase space – with the equivalence class of points connected by the relevant
symmetry transformation constituting realisations of the same possibility.
The relationalist on the other hand, wants to deny that space (space-time) is
a fundamental entity and is therefore committed to disavowing any ontological
distinction between models which differ only with regard to space (space-time)
symmetries. This leaves open two options with regard to the relevant possibility
spaces of the Hamiltonian re-formulation of Newtonian mechanics; either endorse
anti-Haecceitism and stick with the original phase space—this is what Rickles
([2004]) calls unsophisticated relationalism—or move to a quotient space where
all points related by elements of the relevant symmetry group are reduced to
single points. This second option is what we will call reductive relationalism and,
like reductionism with respect to gauge theory, is notably advocated by Belot
([1996],[1999], [2000]).
With these distinctions in hand, and the existence of a connection between
reductionism and relationalism already apparent, we can turn our attention to the
ontological status of time within our timeless theories of nonrelativistic mechanics.
We can define a temporal substantivalist as someone who asserts the existence
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of time as a basic entity in its own right over and above the relations that exist
between the instantaneous states of material systems (be they relationally defined
or not). Such a position is a natural reformulation of the Newtonian concept of
absolute time; in particular, it seems to implement that notion of time defined
in the influential Scholium section of his Principia.31 Now, it could be argued
that, at least as nonrelativistic mechanics is concerned, substantivalist time is
inherently connected to the use of an external temporal dimension and on this
basis a substantivalist would have a very hard time dealing with Jacobi’s theory.
However, what is essential to temporal substantivalism—under our reading of it
at least—is that time can be asserted as a basic entity parameterising change
that is not parasitic on the motion of the bodies that are doing the changing.
Thus, Jacobi’s theory does not in principle exclude temporal substantivalism since
change is parameterised (albeit non-uniquely) in terms of τ . Moreover, unlike
its Newtonian counterpart (as well as parameterised particle mechanics) Jacobi’s
theory offers a level playing field for matching the temporal substantivalist against
their relationalist foe since it is a mechanical framework free from the fundamental
presumption of preferred parameterisation or external time that would inherently
favour a substantivalist reading.
A straightforward (i.e. Haecceitist) temporal substantivalist reading of Ja-
cobi’s theory could then proceed as follows. Just as the reality of space indicates
that there is a real but non-qualitative difference between two sequences of in-
stantaneous states related by a spatial symmetry transformation, the reality of
time indicates that there is a real but non-qualitative difference between two se-
quences of instantaneous states related by a temporal symmetry transformation.
In the first case this difference is represented by sequences of points in velocity-
configuration/phase space differing only with regard to the application on an
element of the Galilei group of global space-time symmetries. In the second it is
represented by two sequences of points in velocity-configuration/phase space dif-
fering only with regard to an application of an element of the reparameterisation
group. In each case this non-qualitative difference can be understood precisely in
Haecceitistic terms because it is established via inter-structure cross-identification
of individual instantaneous states (they play different roles in the different struc-
tures). That these models are connected by an element of the local symmetry
group of time reparameterisations does not mean that they fail to be distinct
because, even though such a symmetry means that there can be no empirical
difference between worlds which differ only with respect to their parameterisa-
tion, our acceptance of Haecceitism allows us to say that there is an ontological
difference. Thus, the straightforward substantivalist type position with respect
to time in Jacobi’s theory leads us to endow parameterisation of solutions with a
stamp of physical reality.
Correspondingly, Jacobi’s theory, at least as formulated in §5.3, leaves open
the conceptual space for a sophisticated (i.e. anti-Haecceitist) form of temporal
31‘Absolute, true, mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without
relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, common time,
is something sensible and external (whether accurate or unequal) measure of duration by which
the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time’ (Newton [1687]).
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substantivalism whereby time is still asserted as a basic ontological entity but the
fundamental temporal structure of a sequence of instantaneous states is multiply
realised in terms of the different parameterisations of a solution – a single fun-
damental notion of time is understood as being represented by the equivalence
class of parameterisations. We do not have an inflation of possibility within the
representation of histories since the difference between two parameterisations of
a solution is understood to be merely of the excluded Haecceitist variety (it is
only which instantaneous states play which roles that is different).
A temporal relationalist can be defined as someone who treats time as a non-
fundamental or derived entity. Such an anti-Newtonian position is typically seen
to have originated with the work of Descartes, Leibniz and perhaps also Huygens
(Barbour [unpublished]). but is contained in the most direct form within the
ideas of Mach.32 With regard to Jacobi’s theory temporal relationalism should
be understood as an insistence that the parameterisation of a solution is un-
physical since it is only the relation between two instantaneous states which
should matter, not how this relation is ‘abstracted’ in terms of parameterisa-
tion.33 Thus, just as the spatial relationalist was committed to two points in
velocity-configuration/phase space which are connected by spatial symmetries
representing the same thing, the temporal relationalist is committed to two pa-
rameterisations of a solution within the relevant space representing the same
thing. This would seem, prima facie, to leave open the option for either an
unsophisticated variant of temporal relationalism whereby we merely utilise anti-
Haecceity to mop-up the excess possibilities entailed by the multiplicity of pa-
rameterisations or a reductive variant whereby we we quotient out the relevant
symmetry group to leave a space with the requisite reduced set of possibilities.
So far the debate seems to resemble closely that for space/space-time. How-
ever there are two new and interesting complications that we must consider. The
first stems from the fact that the reparameterisation symmetry of Jacobi’s the-
ory is, unlike the global symmetries that feature in the space/spacetime debate,
manifestly local. The locality of the symmetry means that a straightforward sub-
stantivalist who sticks with Haecceity and an unreduced possibility space could
be left open to pernicious indeterminism in their ontology of the type discussed in
§5.4. Such a development has been key to the perceived derailment of straightfor-
ward substantivalism for the case of general relativity which features local space-
time symmetries 34 and may be expected for this case also. Our straightforward
temporal substantivalist is understood to be committed to Haecceitism in that
that they admit cross-identification of temporally relabelled instantaneous states
between histories as represented by curves related by reparameterisation. Thus,
the differently parameterised curves are taken to represent ontologically distinct
32‘It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of things by time. Quite on the
contrary, time is an abstraction, at which we arise by means of the change of things’ (Mach
[1883]).
33Such a definition is in full accordance with the notion of a ‘Leibnizian relationalist’ with
respect to time found in (Pooley and Brown [2001]).
34This is in fact the essence of the hole argument, see (Rickles [2008] §4-5) for a more extensive
discussion.
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structures. Such an ontological distinction between objects differing by the ap-
plication of the action of a local symmetry group has the potential to generate
ontological indeterminism since the two curves may initially coincide and then
diverge. Since Jacobi’s theory is an empirically deterministic theory this poten-
tial for ontological indeterminism seems highly problematic and could be taken
to drive us away from the straightforward variant of temporal substantivalism on
the grounds of the commitment to Haecceitism involved.
However, the case of Jacobi’s theory is particularly interesting because al-
though pernicious indeterminism is possible within the velocity-configuration
space of Jacobi’s theory—since the velocities are dependent on parameterisation—
it is not possible within the phase space since reparameterisations are symmetries
on the canonical momenta. This means that provided they confine themselves
to the constraint manifold, a temporal substantivalist can stick to a completely
literal reading of phase space (and the Haecceitism that we are presuming goes
along with it) such that each point represents a distinct instantaneous state and
each solution representing a distinct dynamical history. Thus even though Ja-
cobi’s theory can be classified as a gauge theory in that it features first class
constraints, it has a phase space that can unproblematically accommodate a
non-reductive interpretation without any recourse to anti-Haecceitism. In this
respect it constitutes a notable counter-example to accounts of the interpretation
of gauge theories (such as that presented by Belot and Earman [1999], [2001])
which are presumed by their authors to hold generically.
The second point that marks the substantivalism vs relationalism dispute with
regard to time in Jacobi’s theory distinct from both the case of global symmetries
in Newtonian mechanics and local symmetries in generic gauge theories is that the
reductionist position is no longer available. As discussed extensively above, the
structure of Jacobi’s theory is such that the application of symplectic reduction
will lead to a reduced phase space which has a trivial dynamical structure such
that it can only be made sense of by reference back to the unreduced space. This
renders a reductionist reading of the theory inadequate since to get off the ground
it would require the utilisation of exactly the otiose structure (gauge related
points on the constraint manifold) the elimination of which was its supposed
benefit. Moreover, the reductionist desire to construct a reduced phase space
which can be interpreted along literal lines manifestly fails since on its own the
relevant reduced space can only be read as representing isolated instantaneous
states corresponding to dynamically trivial universes. Thus, with regard to time
in Jacobi’s theory at least, any viable form of relationalism is going to have to
be non-reductive – does this then mean that it must be anti-Haecceitist? In
order to answer this question let us then consider the relationalist credentials
of our two non-reductive strategies for representing change and observables. In
particular, it is interesting to consider how we should interpret their presentation
of dynamics upon the constraint manifold in terms of the ideas of possibility
spaces and Haecceity that we have been discussing.
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6.2 An ontology of timeless change?
As discussed above the emergent time strategy explicitly makes use of the Hamil-
tonian constraint as the generator of evolution. A point on the constraint man-
ifold is taken to represent an instantaneous state and the dynamical change be-
tween this state and the next is represented in terms of the null vector corre-
sponding to the flow generated by the Hamiltonian at that point. Similarly, an
observable is represented by a function of the constraint manifold and the change
in an observable is represented by the change in that function along the Hamil-
tonian flow. Now, it has been argued by Belot and Earman ([1999], [2001]) that
for the case of general relativity treating the relevant Hamiltonian constraint in
such a manner (in particular allowing for observables that do not commute with
the Hamiltonian constraint) is the the hallmark of a Heraclitean position that as-
serts the fundamentality of time within the theory. Conversely, according to this
viewpoint, there is an equivalence between treating the Hamiltonian constraint
as gauge generating (and therefore implementing the Dirac-Bergmann criteria for
observability) and relationalism. Clearly, adopting such a classification scheme for
Jacobi’s theory would seem to suggest that we should think about the emergent
time strategy in terms of temporal substantivalism. Pooley ([2001]) argues that
we should adjust this classification scheme such that how we treat the relevant
constraints of general relativity is now thought of as a guide to deciding between
‘straightforward substantivalism on the one hand and the disjunctive set of so-
phisticated substantivalism and anti-substantialism relationalism on the other’ (p.
15). Thus, under Pooley’s scheme the emergent time strategy for understanding
change in Jaocbi’s theory would be classed as a straightforward substantivalist
one with respect to time. However, as has been argued for the case of gen-
eral relativity (Rickles [2007], p. 170) the assertion of such definite connections
between the treatment of the observables/Hamiltonian constraint and substan-
tivalist/relationalist distinctions is not in fact justified. There is more potential
for metaphysical underdetermination within the formalism than would appear at
first sight. The crucial factor informing Pooley’s distinction is the reduction in
possibility entailed by how we interpret objects within structures connected by
the relevant symmetry. For the case of Jacobi’s theory (and actually also in GR
itself – see The´bault [in preparation] for detailed argument) this turns on how
we understand solutions related by the relevant gauge symmetry and not points
connected by the action of the Hamiltonian constraint. In Jacobi’s theory one
can happily avoid straightforward substantivalism whist still denying that the
Hamiltonian constraint generates gauge so long as one describes the change of
observables (which themselves may fail to respect the Dirac-Bergmann criteria)
without reference to parameterisation – it is change in parameterisation that we
want to call unphysical not the change that is parameterised! The emergent time
strategy is temporally relational since it has removed temporal structure alto-
gether and allows us to describe change, both of observables and states, without
reference to parameterisations. Moreover, it has no need for the anti-Haecceitism
of unsophisticated relationalism since (within a Hamiltonian formalism) it can
make use of a one-to-one representational relationship between points and in-
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stantaneous states on the one hand and solutions uniquely parameterised via the
Newtonian temporal increment and dynamical histories on the other. As such it
is in fact an irresistibly temporally relational mechanical framework since their
is simply no temporal entity available for the substantivalist to reify – in effect a
reduction of the possibilities entailed by the multiplicity of parameterisations has
been enacted. However, this reduction is done by use of the Newtonian temporal
increment rather than by a direct geometric reduction of the relevant symmetry.
The correlation strategy is distinguished by providing a reparameterisation
invariant description of the change of observables which satisfies the second Dirac-
Begrmann criterion of commuting with the constraints but does not make explicit
recourse to the reduced space a` la reductionism. However, as discussed at the
end of the last section it leads us to a notion of change which constitutes a radical
departure from that used in conventional physical theory. The notion of an in-
stantaneous state is dispensed with and the observables are smeared non-locally
along an entire solution as constituted by the gauge orbit of the Hamiltonian con-
straint on the constraint surface in phase space. Thus, like in an anti-Haecceitist
reading of a possibility space structure in gauge theory there is a representational
correspondence between an equivalence class of gauge related points and the fun-
damental individual entity. However, unlike under an anti-Haecceitist viewpoint
the correlation scheme does not treat these points as multiple realisations of the
same structure but rather as a collected realisation. The fundamentally original
manoeuvre is to redefine the idea of a state such that it is closer to the idea of
a history than its original meaning. How should we see the correlation scheme
in the context of our various forms of relationalism and substantivalism? Clearly
it cannot be interpreted in terms of temporally substantivalist ontology since
time or even change in the traditional sense do not feature in the relevant for-
malism. It is also incompatible with reductive relationalism since it utilises the
un-reduced phase space, nor can it be interpreted in unsophisticated relationalist
terms because it does not make use of anti-Haecceitism.
Rather, we must consider the possibility that the correlation strategy can-
not be naturally interpreted in terms of either a relationalist or substantivalist
ontology. If we take the issue of primacy between temporal structure and the
relations between instantaneous states of a material system to demarcate the
distinction between temporal relationalism and substantivalism then clearly a
theory in which there are no instantaneous states or temporal structure will tran-
scend our system of classification. If we define temporal relationalism to mean
simply ‘not temporally substantivalist’ then we can happily think of the correla-
tion scheme as relationalist – but if we are to think more constructively about
temporal relationalism in terms of its Machian philosophical underpinnings with
the concept of time parasitic on relational change, then the correlation scheme
is certainly not relationalist with regard to time since even a derived, relational
notion of time cannot be found within the formalism. What kind of ontology
should we give to the correlation scheme then if not a temporal relationalist one?
The most obvious option would be to take a starkly Parmenidean one – time
is purely an illusion and not even a derived or emergent phenomena. There is
no change or evolution, merely correlations and timeless states corresponding to
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histories which cannot be temporally decomposed into instants. In the context
of nonrelativistic mechanics adopting such a radical notion of timelessness would
seem undesirable given the viability of other options and this, together with the
issue of practical applicability, would seem to push us away from adopting the
correlation strategy. For addressing the problem of representing change and ob-
servables in nonrelativistic timeless mechanics the emergent time strategy clearly
provides us with a better option since its interpretation consequences are far more
palatable. The case of general relativity, however, is another matter, and in that
arena radical timelessness may become a necessity. Since a number of complica-
tions.35 within this more powerful theory must be considered in detail before our
arguments can be reconstructed, we will defer this discussion to further work.36
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